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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.





THE PROUDEST CHAPTER IN HIS LIFE.

MR. BLAINE'S ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE
DEPARTMENT. HIS CONDUCT OF SOUTH
AMERICAN AFFAIRS.

BY
THOMAS H. TALBOT,
(Boston, Massachusetts).



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THE PROUDEST CHAPTER IN HIS LIFE.

I. WHAT MR. BLAINE'S "BEST MEN" SAY : THE BACKS THEM.

SEVERAL of Mr. Blaine's friends have declared what manner of administration they expect his to be. Some of these expressions were made in Mr. Blaine's presence : and all on occasions and by persons who give them weight.

Mr. Rand, of Nevada, who took part in the nomination of Mr. Blaine, speaking of him at Portland, Maine, said : —

"He represented the American idea. The people of this country wanted a man for President who would make this country respected abroad."

Hon. John Sherman, distinguished by long service in the Senate, and still more distinguished as Secretary of the Treasury, said, at Washington : —

"It is said that Blaine is bold and aggressive : that he will obstruct the business interests of the country. I would like to try such a President. He might shake off some of the cobwebs of diplomacy, and invite the attention of mankind to the existence of this country."

General Logan, also of the United States Senate, and now candidate for Vice-President, on the same ticket with Mr. Blaine, said, at Bangor, speaking of him as the candidate of the Republican party : —

"They felt that it would be prudent to take for a candidate a man who understands and appreciates our foreign relations."

And at Ellsworth, in the same State of Maine : —

"The people of this country " "want a man " "who can and will, in proper manner, establish relations with our sister republics of Mexico and South America."

That now venerable statesman, Hannibal Hamlin, the first Republican Vice-President, and of earlier senatorial service than even Mr. Sherman, is reported as saying, at Houlton, that "Blaine was a great statesman, who would introduce a brilliant foreign policy."

Besides these declarations, made in the State where is Mr. Blaine's home, our own member of Congress, Mr. Rice, who so creditably represents the Worcester district, is reported as saying, in Boston, as follows:—

"Are we in favor of the monarchies of Europe controlling the commerce on this American continent? He thought not; and now that we are through with our own little troubles it is time to take our place among the nations of the earth, branch out in a new departure, and assert our principles and have them respected and made effectual. To that policy the Republican party has pledged itself in the nomination of James G. Blaine."

All these expressions, you will note, refer to Mr. Blaine in connection with the administration of our foreign affairs, and my friend, Mr. Rice, serving on the committee on foreign affairs in Congress, his words have especial weight. But all these expressions are significant; they come from Mr. Blaine's political next friends—from his partisan nearest of kin.

And Mr. Blaine himself has encouraged their hopes of his special success in handling our foreign relations. When he had, as he undoubtedly did have, his choice of places in which he would serve the administration of President Garfield, he took the office of Secretary of State, as that in which he could render valuable service to his country and win honorable distinction for himself.

And although his term of service was short, it included matter of great importance. A war, not quite closed, had been going on between some of our sister republics of South America, between Chili on the one side and Peru and Bolivia on the other; and in relation to this matter Mr. Blaine's action was certainly conspicuous. It has commanded, and it deserves, attention, for this reason, besides others: Mr. Blaine himself has passed his judgment upon it; he has reflected upon it and found it entirely to his satisfaction. It seems to him good, very good.

Within a few months after he retired from the State Department he was examined as a witness before a committee of the House of Representatives; and when the questions of the committee were exhausted, and Mr. Blaine was allowed to speak as he would, he closed his testimony with these words:—

"If there is any chapter in my life (associated with a great man that is gone) of which I am proud, and of the complete and absolute vindication of which I feel sure, it is that in connection with the policy laid down by the administration of President Garfield with respect to the South American States."

Here he holds up this piece of his public administration to public admiration. He challenges the criticism of all comers; he invites our special attention. Let us accept his invitation, and consider his action.

II. THE SITUATION, AS MR. EVARTS MADE AND LEFT IT.

The war between these South American states was swift in its course. On February 12, 1879, the Chilean minister to Bolivia was instructed to demand his passports: and in eight days thereafter the whole territory which had been in dispute between Bolivia and Chili was held by Chilean troops. It was April 5 that war was declared against Peru: and before the middle of October the Peruvian navy was disabled, and Chili was undisputed master of the sea. Before the year ended the constitutional President of Peru was overthrown and a dictator ruled in his stead: Peru's calamities in the war causing this revolution. Under this new régime Peru began to show some signs of life and to put forth more vigorous efforts for national defence. Before the next midwinter, that is, in June, 1880, however, the Chileans had large possessions in Peru: they held the department of Tarapacá, part of that of Moquegua, and had taken the city of Arica.

Our minister to Peru, Judge Christiancy, was now of opinion that "the end cometh," or ought to come soon. He ventured to suggest to the supreme chief of the country that Peru should consent to receive propositions of peace, if Chili should see fit to make any such. Into this effort to bring the war to a close Minister Christiancy entered very actively, this object having the approval of our own government at that time, that is, the administration of President Hayes, with Mr. Evarts as Secretary of State. Mr. Christiancy visited the capital of Chili and had interviews with that government in this matter. At length, with the approval of our government, a conference was brought

about between the belligerents. In October, 1880, the representatives, respectively, of Chili, Peru, and Bolivia, met on board the United States Steamer *Lacawanna*, the ministers of the United States to those countries with them, for a conference in the interests of peace. This was in the Bay of Arica, and is known as the Conference of Arica. Our minister to Chili, Mr. Osborn, acted as chairman, by seniority.

The plenipotentiaries of Chili, at the first meeting, presented their proposition or basis of peace; and its first condition was that Peru should cede to Chili the department of Tarapacá. This cession Peru refused absolutely; and upon this demand and refusal the conference came to nothing: leaving the difficulties which lay beyond this first proposition out of our present consideration.

The war was resumed; and now it was a war with this for one of its causes, publicly avowed and recognized as one of its causes: namely, Chili demanded, and Peru refused, cession of the department of Tarapacá.

War was resumed. The Chilean plenipotentiaries fell back, and the Chilean armies once more moved forwards. Their summer, the opening season of their year, was coming on; and in January, 1881, not long after midsummer, the Chilean forces smote the Peruvian army in front of the city of Lima, so that it fled before their face — completely disbanded; and then they entered and took possession of the capital of Peru. And the precise situation of affairs in this country at this time, and from this time forwards, is set forth in a dispatch from our minister at Lima, under a little later date, that of August 10, 1881. He thus wrote:—

"The military situation is perfectly simple. Peru is effectually crippled. She has not a single army or navy; she has no soldiers, no ships, no forts, no fortresses, no guns in position or in the field, no munitions of war, no means of buying any, no revenue, no treasury.

"War, as such, is finished so far as she is concerned, and has been for six months.

"The Chileans have captured or destroyed her navy; have occupied and still hold, and are the seizers of, her capital city, and her custom-houses. They have occupied in force the territory of Tarapacá, with its nitrate beds; and they hold the guano deposits, and all the accessible and fertile valleys debouching on the sea.

They collect the duties at all the ports. They sell the nitrates and guanos."

"In the interior there is some show of resistance, but infinitely more show than substance."

Lima fell as the administration in our country of Mr. Hayes was drawing to its close. Mr. Evarts's note to Mr. Osborn, upon receiving information of the occupation of Lima by the Chilians, was the last which he sent to Chili. He wrote:—

"It is naturally to be inferred that the time has come when the Peruvian government would not refuse to treat upon any supportable basis.

"I have, to-day, instructed Mr. Christiancy to press upon the government of Peru, and upon such Chilian authorities as he may have access to, the earnest desire of this government to bring about a peace without delay and upon reasonable and honorable terms, compatible with the true welfare of all the belligerents so as to be lasting. Your own urgent efforts will be exerted in the same direction."

He used those words well knowing that, during its latter stage, the war had been carried on by Chili because Peru had refused a cession of territory; that the capital of Peru had been captured by the Chilians in order to compel such cession; that such cession was a condition without which Chili would not make peace. Yet he makes no protest against this demand. He does not even suggest that Chili should moderate it. On the other hand, he now expects an altered tone on the part of Peru. The time has come, in his opinion, when she will make peace upon any supportable basis.

This is the aspect in which Mr. Evarts left this affair. This is the situation upon which Mr. Blaine entered. If there was, then, any one fact in the relations of this diplomacy between Chili on the one side and Peru and Bolivia on the other side, well known to the State Department of the United States, it was that Chili demanded a cession of territory from each of her adversaries. The State Department had intimation of this early in the war, very early.

That Chili had definite intentions in this direction in the contingency which actually occurred, our minister to Chili, Mr. Osborn, and our ministers to Peru, Mr. Gibbs and Mr.

Christiancy, agreed in representing to our State Department. If these representations are to be considered as merely intimations of personal opinion on the part of our ministers, still they would serve to put our government upon the effort to obtain more authoritative information. They would also tend to make our government ready to act promptly and advisedly upon such authoritative information when it should come; and it was coming. The intent of Chili was to be made known to our government in a formal and explicit manner.

I have already spoken of the conference at Arica, and as brought about with the approval of our government, and by the efforts of our minister to Peru, Mr. Christiancy. Our minister to Chili, Mr. Osborn, also was active to this end. In fact, the effort seems to have originated with him. Upon this subject he wrote two letters to Mr. Christiancy, copies of which he forwarded to the State Department; and in each of these letters he mentions as a condition of peace, to be insisted upon by Chili in the proposed negotiation, the surrender of Tarapacá. In the second of these letters, he says:—

“ President Pierola ” (that is, the Dictator President of Peru) “ should be fully advised of the conditions which Chili will impose. She will insist upon retaining the province of Tarapacá.”

In the interview which our minister to Peru had with the President of Chili in promotion of this conference, the President of Chili declared that Chili's demand of the territories of Peru and Bolivia south of the river Camerones was absolute and final; and Mr. Christiancy answered that he was persuaded that Peru would consent to the cession demanded of her. Nor was Mr. Christiancy alone in this opinion: the other diplomats at Lima entertained it.

At the Arica conference, as before stated, Chili presented her demands in writing. This, in the presence of the ministers of the United States to Chili, Peru, and Bolivia, respectively. The protocols of that conference were communicated to other governments, and also a Chilean circular setting forth her action and the reasons therefor; and these documents, of course, in this, as well as through the reports

of our ministers, reached the State Department of the United States.

It is true that, at this conference, Chili presented other conditions besides that of the cession of all territory south of the river Camerones. But the other belligerents made absolute refusal of this first condition; and Mr. Christiancy, after the conference was over, was of opinion that compliance with this first condition would then have been accepted by Chili in full satisfaction of all her demands.

Here, then, was this intent of Chili announced to the rest of the world of civilized nations; made known as fairly, as fully — yes, as formally — as was the intention of the United States to abolish slavery made known on and after January 1, 1863. And none of these nations lifted up its voice against it. If any manifestation of opinion at all thereon was made by nations other than ours, it was in the direction of assent. In March, 1836, long before the triumph of Chili was as complete as it afterwards became, Mr. Evarts deemed it not improbable that the European powers might “use effective argument to bring about a practical surrender on the part of Peru and Bolivia.” In the following winter, as winter comes there, Mr. Osborn found European representatives at Santiago and Lima considering how peace could be effected by the surrender of Tarapacá. The rest of the world, then, gave consent that in this matter Chili should execute her will.

And to the United States, especially, this will had been made known. And the United States had not said “nay” to Chili. Not a word of protest, or of reproof, or of remonstrance, or even of advice against demanding this cession of territory, appears to have reached Chili from any of the ministers of the United States at the conference of Arica, or elsewhere, at any time during the progress of this affair. Nor from the Secretary of State of the United States so long as Mr. Evarts was such secretary.

In fine, Chili moved upon Peru, in the later stage of this war, with the consent of the civilized world that, in case of success, she might take the department of Tarapacá; and with the consent especially of the United States.

III. WHAT ACTION MR. BLAINE TOOK.

It was left for Mr. Blaine to change the tone of the United States toward Chili. He entered upon his duties, as Secretary of State, under President Garfield, March 5, 1881. Soon after new ministers were appointed to both Peru and Chili. General Humbert, of Illinois, took the place of Judge Christiancy at Lima, and General Kilpatrick, of New Jersey, replaced Mr. Osborn at Santiago. The instructions to both bear date of June 15, 1881. A few days before, Mr. Blaine received a dispatch from Mr. Osborn containing this sentence:—

"This government will unquestionably insist upon the relinquishment by Peru of the province of Tarapacá; and unless the Peruvian authorities shall be found ready to concede this, the attempt to make peace will fail."

In his instructions to Minister Kilpatrick Mr. Blaine finds occasion, at the outset, to refer to the conference at Arica; and his third sentence opens as follows:—

"It is evident from the protocols of that conference that Chili was prepared to dictate, not to discuss, terms of peace."

This, plainly, is the language of reproof. Here is censure of the course of Chili; of her conduct, taken when Mr. Blaine was not the mouthpiece of the United States; conduct which had been fully communicated to the United States, and had raised no complaint.

Further on the instructions read as follows:—

"It may very well be that at the termination of such a contest the clear condition and relation of all the parties to it may make readjustment of boundaries or territorial changes wise as well as necessary; but this, where the war is not one of conquest, should be the result of negotiation and not the absolute preliminary condition on which alone the victor consents to negotiate."

"While the United States government does not pretend to express an opinion whether or not such an annexation of territory is a necessary consequence of this war, it believes that it would be more honorable to the Chilean government, more conducive to the security of a permanent peace, and more in accordance with the principles which are professed by all the republics of America, that such territorial changes should be avoided as far as possible; that they should never be the result

of mere force, but, if necessary, should be decided and tempered by full and equal discussion between all the powers whose people and whose national interests are involved."

In concluding, this dispatch authorizes its reading to the Chilean minister of foreign affairs, at the discretion of Minister Kilpatrick.

Here, you see, was more language of reproof; for whatever there was of fact to call forth this language was to be found in the intention of the Chilean government, proclaimed to the whole world some months before, and especially made known to the United States; the United States present as a witness when that intention was declared. Chili is to be told that her course, actually and publicly taken in the presence, and with the assent, of the United States, "is calculated to throw suspicions on the professions with which war was originally declared." Our minister is to instruct her that she ought not to have made readjustment of boundaries "the absolute preliminary condition on which alone" she would consent to negotiate, when this was the fact: The United States had approached Chili in the full progress of her victorious operations, and requested Chili to pause for negotiations; and to this request Chili had answered, "We will not pause, save upon the condition of a readjustment of boundaries"; and our government had still pressed Chili to pause upon that condition.

Chili was to be instructed that another course would be more honorable to her government, more conducive to the security of a permanent peace, and more in consonance with those principles which are professed by all the republics of America, than that course which Chili, by her plenipotentiaries, in the presence of the United States, by the invitation of the United States, had declared she would take. She had made this declaration within the jurisdiction of the United States, whither our government had invited Chili to come, knowing that such declaration would be made.

Thereafter, in execution of this declaration, Chili had gone forward in the further prosecution of the war, the United States raising no voice against this course. With the assent of the United States, Chili had carried on war,

through these later months: had expended treasure and blood, that she might have a readjustment of boundaries, as essential to permanent peace: was now by her warlike efforts in possession of the capital of her foe: and at this juncture the United States would step in, and advise her she could not honorably take the understood result of her efforts.

Advice like this of Mr. Blaine's to Chili under the existing circumstances was as much cause of offence, as to the United States, upon the close of our late Civil War, it would have been cause of offence had some government of Europe advised our government that peace with the South should be made without abolishing slavery: the United States having, in the course of the war, by its President, proclaimed that slavery should be abolished as the result of successful war by the United States.

As before said, the instructions to our minister to Peru, General Hurlbut, bore the same date as those to General Kilpatrick. They contained as follows:—

“As the Chilean government has distinctly repudiated the idea that this was a war of conquest, the government of Peru may fairly claim the opportunity to make propositions of indemnity and guaranty before submitting to a cession of territory. As far as the influence of the United States will go in Chili, it will be exerted to induce the Chilean government to consent that the question of the cession of territory should be the subject of negotiation, and not the condition precedent upon which alone negotiation shall commence.”

Here was a definite promise made to Peru, that the United States would endeavor to induce Chili to recede from the position which she had taken in October, 1880, and which in the meantime she had supported by successful war.

In a subsequent paragraph, Mr. Hurlbut is instructed:—

“If, upon full knowledge of the condition of Peru, you can inform this government that Peru can devise and carry into practical effect a plan by which all the reasonable conditions of Chili can be met without sacrificing the integrity of Peruvian territory, the government of the United States would be willing to offer its good offices toward the execution of such a project.”

Clearly, the government of the United States was to

determine what were the reasonable conditions of Chili; and this was a jurisdiction then for the first time assumed by our government.

Accompanying this dispatch was inclosed, "as a strictly confidential communication," "a copy of instructions sent this day to the United States minister at Santiago." This, in order that the minister to Peru might "be advised of the position which this government assumes toward all the parties to this deplorable conflict." That is to say: a copy of the instructions to our minister to Chili was sent to our minister to Peru. The instructions to General Kilpatrick were made known to General Hurlbut. But the instructions to General Hurlbut were not made known to General Kilpatrick.

These instructions proved difficult of execution; as difficult to the ministers to whom they were given, as to the Democratic governors of the Territory of Kansas, just before our Civil War, was the Democratic policy of governing that Territory. It was not long before both of them fell under reproof; and the execution of the policy of these instructions was taken from them and committed to another. There was overzeal on the part of one, and underzeal on the part of another. And, in fact, the minister who was overzealous in behalf of Mr. Blaine's policy received, as he merited, the heavier reproof.

The whole situation soon began to overflow with awkwardness, and to decline toward unpleasantness. Our diplomacy with Peru seemed to blossom out into indiscretion. Our minister to Lima, Mr. Hurlbut, is characterized by Mr. Blaine as "a man of very great intelligence," "of fine education" and "large and great breadth of information," "of great force," "of extraordinary ability," "of unsullied honor and integrity."

But under Mr. Blaine's instructions, he fell into indiscretions. There is no time to specify them, save by quotation from Mr. Blaine, who thus bore witness:—

"It was indiscreet in him to hold communication with the Chilian admiral; it was indiscreet in him to hold communication with the government of Pierola when he had been accredited to the government of Calderon; it was indiscreet in him to ask the

Argentine Confederation to hurry up a minister to Peru; it was indiscreet in him to enter into negotiations in violation of any rights on Peruvian soil to the United States, which was done in the agreement not to withhold concessions under Barral Chimbote. All these things had a tendency to put the United States outside the pale of friendly intervention.

There were indiscretions, four in number, when the minister had not been in Peru months and his position was one of indiscretion for every month of service. Under these circumstances, as he was a man of very great zeal, devotedness, and, as Mr. Blaine testified, had become identified with the Peruvian people and the Peruvian cause, more so, indeed, than was prudent for a minister representing a friendly country, a country friendly to both parties. The minister was taking too "decided and pronounced a course in favor of Peru and the Peruvian cause." The Secretary of State was compelled to check his "overzeal in doing so himself." Mr. Blaine accordingly sent down what he reluctantly terms "a reprimand."

And yet Mr. Blaine, in this category of indiscretions, omits what he considered the greatest indignity and infraction of this minister of the United States, the one calling for "the most decided expression of disapproval." That was nothing less than a negotiation with President Calderon in regard to a railroad company, of which Minister Hurlbut was to become trustee, for the ultimate benefit of an American company.

At this stage, the state council, in common with its two associates had become objectless; and this negotiation, which they had not saved from negotiation, was now entrusted to a special mission. But in order to reach that fact in regard to sequence of events, the narrative must here turn back.

Upon the Peruvian frontier before Lima and the capturing of that city, Pierola, the Dictator of Peru, with the remainder of his army, fled into the interior, and thereafter, out of the Chilian line, which he claims as the ruler of the country. First, the Chilian line, at a meeting of the citizens of Lima, and calling on Mr. Francisco Garcia Calderon was by a formal vote of that meeting declared to continue the government of Peru. This attempt at estab-

lishing a government received some encouragement from Chili; but it was never recognized as the government of Peru by Chili; nor, so far as the correspondence shows, by any government save our own. Mr. Christiancy never represented it as established *de facto*, and never recommended our government to recognize it. On the other hand, by a dispatch received at our State Department May 5, he informed Mr. Blaine that it was "quite clear that the overwhelming majority of the people of Peru" were opposed to this government, and still adhered to Pierola.

This which he wrote later was true then, as the statement shows:—

"The fact is that it is not a government *de facto*, or in the exercise of the functions of government anywhere, except so far as the Chilian authorities choose to allow it to exercise any powers of the kind; and these are confined within very narrow limits. It has been allowed to exercise thus far full powers only in the little hamlet of Magdalena."

Not only was this the state of facts existing in early May; but also it was the state of facts then known to Mr. Blaine. Yet on May 9th he received Mr. Elmore as the confidential agent of this not established government. He seems to acknowledge that it was not a government actually established. He does not direct Minister Christiancy to recognize it, except upon conditions to be ascertained. And here he does not put the simple condition whether or not it is a government actually established, whether Peru had accepted, had acquiesced in, this government. He did not follow what Minister Christiancy mentions as "the safe and generally approved rule of recognizing a new government (namely), that it should appear to be a government *de facto*." On the other hand the conditions are:—

"If the Calderon government is supported by the character and intelligence of Peruvians, and is really endeavoring to restore constitutional government, with a view both to order within and negotiation with Chili for peace."

When before did the United States make such conditions of recognizing a foreign government?

How was Mr. Blaine induced to state these as the conditions of recognizing this provisional government of Calder-

on? Had he been told by Calderon's representative that these conditions existed? If he had not been thus informed from that source, what information had he, which, according to his own showing, justified his action? If he had such information, was not Minister Christiancy directed to make, outside the line of established usage, such inquiries and such only as would result in a favorable answer?

And yet this minister found it quite difficult to give a favorable answer even to these leading questions.

What and with what view the Calderon government was endeavoring to do, he could learn only by its own professions. But the first question was a still more difficult one. If mere money or financial influence were referred to by Mr. Blaine, that might be supporting the Calderon government. That was to be found along the coast, which was completely controlled by the Chilians, in a class who were ready for peace at any price and upon any terms, which was something not to Mr. Blaine's desire. But if reference was to the weight of influence upon political or government matters, there was great room for doubt; it might turn out to be against the provisional government.

But upon one point he was not in doubt; he was certain, and continued certain as long as he continued in Peru; and the diplomatic corps at Lima agreed with him. That point was that the government of Calderon was not accepted by the people of Peru; was not a government *de facto*. Had Mr. Blaine put that as a condition of its recognition, he would never have recognized it. He wrote, June 21, 1881:

"It is the settled and unanimous opinion of all intelligent men here that it would not last a day after the Chilians should leave the country."

He finally determined to recognize it only because "seeing that the question whether the Calderon government was a government *de facto* was not expressly made a condition."

If left to act according to his own judgment, he would have waited till this government had become a government *de facto*, or until it were better established. But he could not set up his own judgment against that of his government; his duty was that of strict obedience. Thus over-

borne by action and instructions from Washington, he reluctantly recognized the Calderon government. What else could he have done, after the State Department at Washington had recognized it? Would it have been proper that recognition should have been granted by the superior at Washington, and then withheld by the subordinate at Lima? Later he had reason to fear that his action was premature, and his dispatch closes as follows : —

“ I fear, however, this recognition will lead to many complications. But I have obeyed what I was compelled to consider your orders.”

This was the government in the displacement of which Mr. Blaine afterward found probable cause of war between the United States and Chili.

That Mr. Blaine, in this action, was departing from the true path of diplomatic usage appears when he undertakes to justify his action. He says : —

“ We recognized that government in supposed conformity to the wishes of the Chilean government.”

Furthermore, he makes this action of the United States appear as a substantial element of “ increased strength and confidence ” to that government. That is, this had become the government of Peru, not a little by the wishes of Chili and the support of the United States. One of Mr. Hurlbut's indiscretions, it is well to recall here, was committed in his effort to strengthen the Calderon government, that is, in his intermeddling with the internal politics of Peru.

For Mr. Blaine's supposition that Chili wished the United States to recognize the government of Calderon, the correspondence shows very little ground. The last communication from Santiago, which Mr. Blaine received before his own act of recognition, represented that government as considered not strong enough to negotiate with ; and the next communication represented the Chilean hopes of strength on the part of that government as “ seriously weakened.”

From Mr. Christiancy also Mr. Blaine had learned that the Chilean military had refused to allow this government to occupy the government palace, and raise over it the Peruvian flag and to control the custom-house and collection of duties. That is, it was not allowed to exercise the authority of a government.

This was the government which Mr. Blaine, of his own motion, at Washington, lectured to reconvert. To this government Mr. Blaine upholding, while it stood, the United States' intervention, after Mr. Christy's recall in August, a nation whose woolly heart, according to Mr. Blaine, was troubled with the Peruvian people and the Peruvian cause.¹ He was overzealous in this cause, and at length distinguished himself by the manner of his indiscretions, which were exposed.

Among these indiscretions, you will recollect, was a communication to the Chilean commander, Admiral Lynch, a brave sailor, of Irish descent, of whose services Chili gladly avails herself. In this communication the United States speaks as supreme judge, having complete jurisdiction over the case and the parties.

The United States, says Mr. Hurlbut,

"do not approve of war for the purpose of territorial aggrandizement, nor of the violent dismemberment of a nation, except as a last resort and in extreme emergencies. As there never has been any question of boundaries between Peru and Chili, and, therefore, no need to regulate; and as Chili has repeatedly, publicly, and officially declared any purpose or design of forcible annexation of territory, we are clearly of opinion that such action now would not be in accordance with the dignity and public faith of Chili, and would be a source of perpetual tranquillity of both countries, by establishing every serious grievance, which would constantly tend to manifest itself in disturbances."

We are also clear of the opinion that Peru ought to have the opportunity for a free and free discussion of the terms of peace, for which, finally, as may be satisfactory; and that it is contrary to justice, which should prevail among enlightened nations, to permit a nation, such as a *signa potestas*, to transfer territory, which she claims to be the jurisdiction of Chili, without consulting the people, and the unwillingness of Peru to do so, is a source of serious concern.

"Such a course of action, therefore, would meet with decided disapproval of the people of the United States."

Here is the war, as Mr. Hurlbut says—

"We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that the act of seizure of Peruvian territory, and the seizure of the same to Chili, whether done by means of force, or by dictating the same as an imperative condition of the cessation of hostilities, in manifest contradiction of previous declarations of such purpose by Chili, would justly be regarded by other nations as evidence that

Chili had entered upon the path of aggression and conquest for the purpose of territorial aggrandizement."

The purpose of Chili, which is here reproved, was — let me repeat again — a purpose made known to the world before Chili moved against the capital of Peru and with her armies captured it, and assented to by the neutral nations, specially the United States.

It would have been easy for Mr. Hurlbut, when Admiral Leach inquired of him as to the intentions of the United States, to have answered: "The United States is not a party to the conflict between Chili and her adversaries, and does not intend to make herself such party." But that answer he did not make. On the other hand he used language of interposition, of interference, of active, forcible intervention.

What effect could such language from the mouth of the United States have upon a Peruvian government, the breath of whose life almost came from the United States? It could but inspire such a government with new hopes of making head against Chili and to efforts towards renewing the conflict with her. Under such influence from the United States, it would be no wonder if this government of Calderon became guilty, or, at least became fairly liable to Chilean suspicion, of secret warlike intrigues and movements. Accordingly, under the existing circumstances, it was no strange thing that in course of time (September 28) the Chilean commander, the same Irish admiral, ordered its head to suspend the exercise of its functions within the Chilean lines; and later (November 6), this order not being implicitly obeyed, Calderon was taken a prisoner of war to Chili.

At this point in my narrative I come to a pause: to a full stop almost. It is true indeed that the interest can be kept up still further on. But here terminated Mr. Blaine's influence in this business. From May to November, six months at least, the supreme effort of our State Department, Mr. Blaine at its head, had been, ostensibly, to prevent Chili from annexing Peruvian territory: to bring her to consent to terms of peace without insisting upon such annexation. As a means towards that end, he would have the Chilean government recognize the government of Cal-

deron as the government of Peru. And to take our story from a dispatch of Minister Hurlbut, when by the aid of "the moral weight of the United States" that government had gained some strength, the Chilians stamped it out by military force.

IV. WHAT MR. BLAINE NEXT ATTEMPTED, AND HOW IT CAME TO NAUGHT.

This was all that came of Mr. Blaine's intervention in the unpleasantness in the South Pacific. It had failed, and failed signally. True, he did not desist here. He had resort to other measures; but these other measures never went beyond the mere manifestation of opinion and intention. They fell short of action:

"Old grandsire Priam
Striking short at Greeks, his antique sword"
. . . . "lies where it falls
Repugnant to command."

There they are, written in the records of the State Department, preserving the memory of what Mr. Blaine intended and the United States would not execute.

These other measures involved the necessity of a special mission. So General Kilpatrick and General Hurlbut was each informed. William Henry Trescott, Esquire, of South Carolina was commissioned as special envoy, with the rank of minister plenipotentiary to the republics of Chili, Peru, and Bolivia: the third Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Walker Blaine, accompanying him.

Here, where Mr. Blaine's South American policy culminated, it is worth while to be particular about dates. The arrest of Calderon took place at Lima, on November 6. On the next day, the 7th, Mr. Hurlbut telegraphed this fact to Mr. Blaine. On November 14, Calderon's minister at Washington called at the State Department, and orally informed Mr. Blaine of the arrest of his chief. Eight days thereafter the plan of sending out a special mission had been adopted. Still later by three days, that is, on November 25, Mr. Blaine telegraphed to Mr. Kilpatrick:—

"United States does not understand the abolition of Calderon government and his arrest,"

as though the United States desired some explanation from the Chilean government. Without waiting for answer to this telegram, on November 30, the commissions to the envoy and attaché were delivered; and on December 1 the envoy received his full instructions. Two days later the State Department received the dispatch of Minister Hurlbut communicating fully the facts of the arrest. Meanwhile no answer had come from our minister to Chili to the call for an explanation of the action of the Chilean government, and no communication from him, touching that action, was received by Mr. Blaine. General Kilpatrick's dispatches, reporting and giving the reasons for the arrest of Calderon, were received, not by Mr. Blaine, but by his successor, Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Let us see what was the message which was prepared, and for which a special embassy was raised, with such haste. Having recited facts pertaining to the Calderon government down to the suspension of its authority by the Chilean military, within their lines, the letter of instruction thence proceeds:—

“Unable to understand this sudden, and, giving due regard to the professions of Chili, this unaccountable, change of policy, this government instructed its ministers at Lima to continue to recognize the Calderon government until more complete information would enable it to send further instructions. If our present information is correct, immediately upon the receipt of this communication they arrested President Calderon: and thus, as far as was in their power, extinguished his government.”

Here, you will notice, Mr. Blaine is not entirely assured of the main ground of his action: the offence itself. To use the language of the criminal law, he is not quite certain of a *corpus delicti*. I have called your attention to the meagreness of his information at the time of this his writing.

Then, as to that arrest having been caused, in any degree, by Mr. Blaine's instruction to Mr. Hurlbut to continue to recognize the Calderon government, there is still less basis of fact. All, apparently, that Mr. Blaine knew about that, at the time when he made this suspicion the basis and foundation of his instructions to a special envoy and plenipotentiary

extraordinary, was that such instructions had been sent to, and received by, the United States minister a few days before such arrest. He did not know that the receipt of that instruction had been made known to the Chilean authorities in Santiago or even in Lima. Nor could the Chilean authorities have inferred the receipt of such instruction from any change in the conduct of Minister Hurlbut toward the Chilean government; for the instruction required no such change. Mr. Hurlbut had, without break, continued to recognize that government, and actively to support it.

But not only was Mr. Blaine without good ground for his suspicion against the Chilean government; but also he had authentic information to opposite effect. Thirty-three days before Calderon was arrested Minister Hurlbut wrote to the State Department that he probably would be arrested, and gave the reason therefor, which was this: Calderon had received from Admiral Lynch an order "to cease his functions and to surrender all his archives, books, and papers." Thereupon, the dispatch recites:—

"Mr. Calderon consulted with me on receipt of this order, and said very firmly that he should not do it. Inasmuch as it was very probable that this act of disobedience would be promptly followed by the arrest of the Legation, Mr. Calderon the propriety of making some arrangement by which some legitimate business could be provided in case he was disabled from acting, and he said that Congress was quietly in session, and that he would select Admiral Montt as Vice-President, thus continuing the constitutional succession."

"I also received from Mr. Gay, the secretary for foreign affairs, such books, documents, and correspondence as he considered essential, and shall hold them in this legation."

This dispatch does not give the date of its receipt, which, among the clues, would have been about November 1, or, at the latest, a few days before arrest was made. It certainly was received before the final decision was determined upon; and given to that effect Mr. Blaine had no other information on this subject from Minister Hurlbut. Here, then, is the authentic information in our hands that the Chilean government had no knowledge of any such order for a reason given. It will have Calderon arrested because he disobeys

the orders of the Chilean commander in occupation of Peru. Having this information and no other, Mr. Blaine, when the action is taken, hastens to assign to it another reason: namely, an intent to insult the United States. Mr. Hurlbut writes Mr. Blaine that Calderon has given the Chilean government good grounds for his arrest: say Peruvian grounds. Mr. Blaine, learning of the arrest, assumes that it was for reasons relating to the United States and treats it as giving cause of immediate war. Were the foreign affairs of the United States ever before jockeyed in this style?

The instructions go on:—

"The President does not now insist upon the inference which this action would warrant. He hopes that there is some explanation which will relieve him from the painful impression that it was taken in resentful reply to the continued recognition of the Calderon government by the United States. If, unfortunately, he should be mistaken, and such motive be avowed, your duty will be a brief one. You will say to the Chilean government that the President considers such a proceeding as an intentional and unwarranted offence, and that you will communicate such an avowal to the government of the United States, with the assurance that it will be regarded by the government as an act of such unfriendly import as to require the immediate suspension of all diplomatic intercourse. You will inform me immediately of the happening of such contingency, and instructions will be sent to you."

In the next two paragraphs the instructions fell into a more peaceful flow. The worst may not be true. Mr. Blaine does not anticipate that it is. But thereafter the war spirit rises again. The secretary declares:—

"It is difficult for me to say now how far an explanation would be satisfactory to the President which was not accompanied by the restoration or recognition of the Calderon government."

Further on there is instruction, grave and solemn warning, as of the farsighted statesman, to Chili, of the dangers of her evil course. The instructions recite:—

"But this government feels that the exercise of the right of absolute conquest is dangerous to the best interests of all the republics of this continent; that from it are certain to spring other wars and political disturbances."

"This government also holds that, between two independent nations, hostilities do not, from the mere existence of war,

confer the right of conquest until the failure to furnish the indemnity and guaranty which can be rightfully demanded.

"The United States maintains, therefore, that Peru has the right to demand that an opportunity should be allowed her to find such indemnity and guaranty. Nor can this government admit that a cession of territory can be properly exacted far exceeding in value the amplest estimate of a reasonable indemnity.

"The annexation of Tarapacá, which, under proper administration, would produce annually a sum sufficient to pay a large indemnity, seems to us to be not consistent with the execution of justice."

This strain of the instructions closes with these words of portentous warning:—

"If our good offices are rejected, and this policy of the absorption of an independent state be persisted in, this government will consider itself discharged from any further obligation to be influenced in its action by the position which Chili has assumed, and will hold itself free to appeal to the other republics of this continent to join it in an effort to avert consequences which cannot be confined to Chili and Peru, but which threaten with extremest danger the political institutions, the peaceful progress, and the liberal civilization, of America."

On the next day additional instructions were given to Mr. Trescott, the purport of which was to authorize him, if he should deem it advisable, to return home by way of Buenos Ayres and Rio Janeiro, the capitals respectively of the Argentine Republic and Brazil. The Argentine Republic was known by our State Department to be on not the best of terms with Chili.

Returning now to the instructions in chief, the inquiry arises: what was their basis of fact? In justification of this reproof and this exhortation, what knowledge had Mr. Blaine of the intentions of Chili? What knowledge had he when he thus exhorted, reproved, and threatened?

He had this knowledge, and no more. He had the declaration of Chili's plenipotentiary, made on board a United States vessel-of-war, in the presence of ministers of the United States, whose presence there, as well as the whole conference, was with the approval and the initiating invitation of the United States. This was more than a year before the date of these belated instructions. It was on the twenty-second of October, 1880, and now it was the first

of December, 1881. Meanwhile Chili had made no new declaration of her intention. In 1881 Mr. Blaine knew what Mr. Evarts knew in 1880, and he knew no more. Chili's intention, as known to Mr. Blaine, had been made known to the United States, when Mr. Evarts was what Mr. Blaine afterwards became, the mouthpiece of the United States; when Mr. Evarts was alike authorized to speak, or to maintain silence, for this nation. And silence he had maintained. It was the silence of assent. By the authority vested in him, and in the President who was over him, he had pledged the United States not to intervene, not to interfere. Keeping silence then, the United States was bound forever after to hold its peace.

It was not in character for the United States to go back upon its pledge. The United States did not. It refused to interfere; it drew back from intervention.

Mr. Blaine gave place to Mr. Frelinghuysen, as Secretary of State, December 19, 1881. Mr. Frelinghuysen, on January 3, and again on January 4, 1882, by telegraph essentially modified the instructions which had been given to Mr. Prescott. By January 9 full instructions were drawn up to be sent by mail. Let me quote from them:—

“The President wishes in no manner to dictate or make any authoritative utterance to either Peru or Chili as to the merits of the controversy existing between these republics, as to what indemnity should be asked or given, as to a change of boundaries, or as to the *personnel* of the government of Peru. The President recognizes Peru and Chili to be independent republics, to which he has no right or inclination to dictate.”

This much the President, speaking by Mr. Frelinghuysen, felt bound to communicate especially for the benefit of the government of Chili, by way of “modifying”—that is a very gentle term—the original instructions given by Mr. Blaine. In all the diplomacy of the United States, how many times has a President felt called to use toward another nation apologetic language such as that?

The instructions continue:—

“Were the United States to assume an attitude of dictation toward the South American republics, even for the purpose of preventing war, the greatest of evils, or to preserve the autonomy of nations, it must be prepared, by army and navy, to

enforce its mandate, and to this end tax our people for the exclusive benefit of other nations."

Of course this is true. When, therefore, the United States was about to say to Chili: "The annexation of Tarapacá seems to us inconsistent with the execution of justice," the United States was proceeding to bind itself to prevent, by force, Chili from annexing that Continent.

Then, with some explanation, these words of the original instructions were recalled:—

"You will say to the Chilean government that the President considers such a proceeding" (that is, the arrest of Calderón) "as an intentional and unwarranted offence, and that you will communicate such an avowal to the government of the United States, with the assurance that it will be regarded by the government as an act of such unfriendly import as to require the immediate suspension of all diplomatic intercourse. You will inform me immediately of the happening of such a contingency, and instructions will be sent to you."

This passage in the original instructions calls out this comment as accompaniment to its revocation:—

"Believing that a prolific cause of contention between nations is an irritability which is too readily offered in, the President prefers that he shall himself determine, after report to him, whether there is, or is not, cause for offence."

Here the President seems to be of opinion that the temper of Hotspur is not the one in which international affairs should be conducted. Further, he has an aversion to final action upon a hypothetical case, a lawyer's sympathy, which doubtless Mr. Fredricks was fully aware of. He is, of course, willing that his representative should propose a question, and upon receipt of an answer should notify the immediate suspension of all diplomatic intercourse. He even dares to pass upon that question himself, upon full knowledge of all the facts.

Mr. Blaine, too, conscious of what Calderón is not that of a lawyer, has no home for a hypothetical case. He makes one up easily. He bids Mr. Fredricks put to the Chilean government the categorical question:—

"Do you bite your thumb at us, sir?"

If the Chilean government says yea, what is to follow?

Why, something that Shakespeare has sketched. In a chorus, where the action is shown as very rapid, he tells how negotiations closed between the French king and Henry V.

“The offer likes not; and now the nimble gunner
With linstock the devilish cannon touches,
And down goes all before him.”

This whole quarrel about Calderon, wholly of Mr. Blaine's making, so far as it was made at all, has, let me notice in passing, its ridiculous aspect. It was absurd to suppose that Chili, having taken certain action for which she could give Peruvian reasons “as plenty as blackberries,” would avow that her purpose was to insult the United States. Engaged in a conflict involving her relative position on the continent, how could she be led aside to give needless offence to a powerful third party like our nation? In any event how could she be induced to avow such motive? What good sense was there in asking her if she bit her thumb at us? Even in Shakespeare there is given a form of answer to this question which avoids offence — namely :

“I do bite my thumb, sir.”

Chili at least could have availed herself of that form.

In fact, Mr. Blaine out of the way, this matter was easily adjusted between the Chilean minister at Washington and our Secretary of State, in a single interview. Our plenipotentiary extraordinary at Santiago was relieved from duty in “the Calderon question” altogether.

Then, there seems to be a new preference as to the route by which this special envoy with the rank of plenipotentiary extraordinary to the republics of Chili, Peru, and Bolivia, should return home. The instructions go on : —

“It is also the President's wish that you do not visit — although indicated in your original instructions you should do so, as the envoy of this government, the Atlantic republics after leaving Chili.

“The United States is at peace with all the nations of the earth, and the President wishes hereafter to determine whether it will conduce to that general peace, which he would cherish and promote, for this government to enter into negotiations and consultation for the promotion of peace with selected friendly

nationalities without extending a like confidence to other peoples with whom the United States is on equally friendly terms.

"If such partial confidence would create jealousy and illwill, peace, the object sought by such consultation, would not be promoted."

These instructions close with this significant sentence:—

"The President, at all events, prefers time for deliberation."

Thus Mr. Blaine's instructions of December 1 were revoked; and the United States drew back from an "appeal to the other republics of this continent to join it in an effort" against Chili. They were revoked because they threatened—because they led to—war.

V. MR. BLAINE WELL WARNED OF THE SITUATION, AND WHAT HE RELIED UPON TO AVOID WAR.

And that his course did lead to that result, Mr. Blaine was advised by those conversant with the situation, and whose duty it was to give him information, early and late.

Before Mr. Blaine had written a line in this affair, he was informed by Minister Christman that

"the influence of the United States on this coast upon any question connected with this war, or the settlement of peace, can only be secured by active intervention, in some form, against the will of the Chilean government."

Twice on the same day, in two different dispatches, he expresses this opinion, using the term "active intervention" in each dispatch. He had before informed the department that, before the battle which opened Lima to her enemy, Chili had declared that she would accept neither mediation nor good offices. Before he left Lima, on August, he twice again asserted this opinion. His successor, General Harbot, wrote to the same effect four times before the special mission to the warring republics was determined upon. The Peruvian minister at Washington had been three times asked for the intervention of the United States; "resolute intervention" is his expression in his third request. Later information is to the same effect. This was Mr. Prescott's opinion after he had reached the scene of his mission. "Chili," he says, "will maintain her position

until the demonstration of a forcible intervention by the United States is made."

There is action of the Chilean government confirming these opinions. The temper of the Chilean government had been exceedingly tried by the conduct of our minister to Peru, General Harburt. He is reported to have protested against Calderon's arrest; and there were some tokens that Chilean jealousy against our government was, by this time, fully aroused. According to Mr. Harburt, that arrest was effected with a good deal of unnecessary military display: troops in the streets at two o'clock Sunday morning, the whole square about Calderon's residence closely guarded, one company thrown across the front of the United States Legation to prevent his seeking aylum there. Down on the harbor of Callao by the Chilean ironclads, one of which was to receive this prisoner of war; and also our navy was represented there, it seems, by wooden ships. These wooden ships might possibly have received orders, originating from Mr. Blaine, to be fired against what the Chilean government would then have done; and the *New York Tribune* reports the Chilean ironclads as having got into position to demolish them if they made any hostile demonstration.

Later, Mr. Trescott, while still under the bellicose instructions which he had received from Mr. Blaine, had, at least, one interview with the Chilean minister of foreign affairs, in which the merits of the question were treated; that is, some days before the knowledge that those instructions had been revoked appears to have reached Santiago. And in that interview the Chilean minister asserted the old Chilean demands, substantially as they were made on board the United States vessel of war in the Bay of Arica. There was no backing down on the part of Chile. She would have Tarapacá and she would have also twenty millions of indemnity, with other considerations that need not be specified. If Peru would not yield this, then Chile wished no further interference by the United States. This, when the powerful impression of a positive and lingering denial by the United States that Chile should make an immediate proposition on such terms as the United States deemed just and proper,

had produced in Santiago a very excited state of feeling; while, as there known, the thunderbolt aimed at the Chilian government by Mr. Blaine had not lost its impelling force; while it was still rattling through the upper air.

Furthermore, you will recollect that Chile's great offence was her action toward Calderon, the supplanter of his government. It was upon this point, that, according to Mr. Blaine, the President was so difficult to please.

"The gods are hard to reconcile."

you know. Well, in this latter view mention was made of Calderon. It came up in this way. The question arose how far the Chilean government would facilitate Mr. Trescott's wish to confer with a Peruvian government. The answer was ready: To any extent, save as to conference with Calderon. The United States could have no conference with him.

Here was Mr. Blaine fully warned, after developements tending to verify the warnings, that a certain course toward Chili would be futile, would be vain and idle, unless the United States was ready to support it by force or intervention; and yet he went on to take that course. He ordered communications to be made which were wholly unbecoming his government, unless the army and navy of the United States were to enforce them. The President, in revoking such orders, so understood their import.

Mr. Blaine's attention has been called to this aspect of his policy; and apparently he has given us what he relied upon to turn aside his action from carrying the United States into war. As a witness before the committee already mentioned, he found occasion to state what, in his opinion, made ridiculous the expectation of war as the result of his policy. In the first place, he was confident that he was dealing with Chili alone—unsupported and alone.

No other nation would intervene, though our ministers complain of the disposition of European representatives—Italian, French, but more especially English—to thwart their efforts to bring about peace, and though Mr. Blaine himself is positive that the war of Chili was wholly in English interest: "an English war," he says.

Then, may there not have been something in the rumor that the Chilian government made inquiry how far several European governments would aid Chili in resisting the pretensions of the United States, as set up by Mr. Blaine, and received a satisfactory answer?

And yet this is the way in which he derides the apprehension that his course led to war:—

“And that is the terrible war that I was going to urge the country into, in which the United States was to be ruined by Chili.”

Why not? Let us see why not, in Mr. Blaine's opinion. He continues right on:—

“Eighteen hundred thousand people, eight thousand miles away, were going to whip the United States.”

Here is no pretext that he was not giving Chili just cause of war—was not proceeding toward her in such a manner as with a larger nation would have resulted in a conflict of arms. But the decisive fact, which is to silence all criticism upon that proceeding, is that the people against whom it was aimed were too few and too far off to wage war with the United States.

Mr. Blaine makes little account of the fact that small nations sometimes have great spirit. Massachusetts, when she had not one twentieth of the present population of Chili, did not hesitate to raise fortifications against the king of England. Prussia, also, once a dukedom, and thereafter only a small kingdom, made her advancement by courage always. It may be that the Republic of Chili, never accused of lacking audacity, follows the same way to greatness.

VI. HIS ACTION UNPRECEDENTED, UNAUTHORIZED, INCONSISTENT WITH THE PREVIOUS BEARING OF THE UNITED STATES, INJURIOUS TO BOTH CHILI AND PERU, DISCREDITABLE TO THE UNITED STATES, AND AGAINST THE INTEREST OF CIVILIZATION IN SOUTH AMERICA.

Has Mr. Blaine's conduct of these affairs any justification?

There was, certainly, no principle of international law which imposed upon the United States the duty to interfere

in this matter. The recognized, established foreign policy of our nation forbade such interference. Under Mr. Evarts, who preceded Mr. Blaine, there was no motion toward interference. Under Mr. Frelinghuysen, who followed him, Mr. Blaine's threats of interference were retracted; and when the President set aside Mr. Blaine's policy he placed his country once more in line with the policy of Washington. And the policy laid down by Washington has been that followed by the United States, except during a portion of the year 1881.

Mr. Blaine claims the authority of no precedent for his course. On the other hand, he makes a statement of opposite purport. He speaks of the policy which he entered upon as an original policy. He testifies that he himself originated it. Certainly, it has no American precedent or prototype. It appears to be original. It worked like a new policy.

But if international law or the established policy of the United States had made it proper, at any time, for the United States to intervene in this quarrel, eight thousand miles away, as Mr. Blaine tells us, that time had gone by, when, in the presence of the United States, Chili declared that she would resume hostilities against Peru, in order to obtain a cession of territory, of the department of Tarapacá. When Mr. Blaine became Secretary of State, the United States was pledged not to interfere to prevent that cession; and Mr. Blaine's projected, attempted interference was in violation of good faith to Chili.

It was a policy beneficial to neither party which it was to affect. Says Mr. Prescott:—

"The Peruvian government does believe that the United States will intervene."

He adds:—

"It is obvious that neither Chili nor Peru will approach the solution of their difficulties in the proper spirit, or with any hope of a result satisfactory to both, as long as this impression lasts."

It was an intermeddling in a quarrel to the prolongation of that quarrel. June, 1882, found our special envoy back

again in the United States, and our effort at intervention wholly ended. But it was 1884 before peace was made between Chili and Peru; and then substantially on Chili's terms as opposed by Mr. Blaine. That Mr. Blaine's action prolonged, if it did not wholly cause, this delay is very clear. Mr. Prescott found that "three fourths of the business men on the coast would make peace at the cost of the cession of Tarapacá"; and the government recognizing its necessity. What was to prevent? The belief that the United States would intervene, he tells us.

How has this policy affected the position of the United States in South America? Mr. Blaine answers that question. He says it destroyed the position of the United States there.

"She has got no position at all. And we earned in the end the high rank and title of being absolutely the subject of funny cartoons, in which the American navy is represented as being blown out of water by the Chilean fleet, and it is believed all over Chili to-day that we backed down for fear of being thrashed."

The merits of the conflict between Chili and her adversaries I have not adverted to. There is, however, another question which is of interest to the people of the United States, upon which I may venture to spend a few moments before passing to my conclusion. This question is: What was the relation of this war to the cause of social order and good government? How do the respective parties stand affected to the interest of civilization in South America?

The papers of our State Department throw some light upon this question. Minister Christiancy wrote to Mr. Exarts of the Spanish conquerors in Peru having extinguished a civilization more humane than their own, and destroyed useful improvements which their race have never been able to equal or replace. To Mr. Blaine he wrote much more fully upon the same topic. He states, with a personal observation of over two years, and the best sources of information within his reach, that he is "unable to discover any sufficient elements here for establishing an independent, or even any kind of regular or permanent, government by Peru; certainly, no form of popular government by the Peruvians themselves." For this opinion

he gives some reasons, among which I find these statements : —

“ I do not think there are now in the city of Lima two hundred families of pure white blood, and probably not in all Peru two hundred thousand of the white race unmixed.

“ The laboring-classes in Peru are sunk beyond the hope of redemption.”

Of their army he says : —

“ The officers (all white) fled by scores. The battle of the thirteenth opened at daylight some ten miles from Lima, and at nine o'clock, A. M., I saw in the streets of Lima enough Peruvian officers with shoulder-straps to make an entire regiment.”

And this with reference to their administration of government : —

“ There seems to be no fixed principle of honesty, no idea even of that self-sacrificing patriotism which is essential to a proper and honest administration of government.”

In the same dispatch he mentions the project of a protectorate of Peru by, and also of its annexation to, the United States. But he declares himself opposed to annexation unless Peru should remain a territory for ten years, a probationary period which he deems necessary to fit her people for admission into the Union. Having given a picture of Peru, feebly drawn as he says, he asks that his letter may be treated as strictly confidential, and declares that his life would not be safe in Lima “ for one day, if it were made public.”

The Peruvian army disbanding itself after its defeat in front of Lima, the city came nigh being destroyed by a Peruvian mob, made up largely of disbanded soldiers, before the Chilean army entered it. Meanwhile, it was saved solely by a military organization of neutrals.

Of the utter helplessness of Peru, Mr. Prescott writes in reference to the matter of saving Tarapacá : —

“ There is not, in my opinion, the slightest possibility of Peru's contributing anything” (“ anything” is his word) “ to such a result. She depends entirely upon the action of the United States.”

One need not look outside the dispatches of this same minister (Christiancy), unfriendly as he was to Chili in this

contest, to find how superior is her character. The Chilean army officers, he says, were far superior to those of Peru. By the entry of the Chilean army "Lima was saved from destruction." All neutrals and many of the Peruvians felt a sense of relief, upon their entry; and the neutrals dreaded their departure. This, while he speaks of the Chilean common soldiers as "savages." Later, Minister Huribut writes of a sudden withdrawal of the Chilean forces from Lima, without the Peruvian authorities being first supplied with arms, as "likely to be followed by mob rule and great violence in Lima."

Mr. Christiancy says:—

"The Chilean officials have conducted themselves with great propriety and fidelity in the preservation of the peace and good order of the city of Lima."

And while writing of affairs of war he uses this strong language:—

"The government of Chili is composed of more enlightened men, wholly emancipated from the control of the church and ready to adopt all modern improvements in warfare."

Again he writes:—

"Chili has been able to secure a more permanent government and better to enforce financial honesty in her administration, and to preserve her public credit."

For this reason, and because "their property would be more safe," many men of wealth among the Peruvians, he says, prefer "that the Chileans should govern the country": preferring this, apparently, to anything, except "a protectorate of, or annexation to, the United States."

Here Mr. Christiancy refers to the whole country, the whole of Peru. But Chili made no demand of the whole of Peru. Before the United States began to intermeddle, she demanded, and since the United States ceased to intermeddle, she has contented herself with taking a small portion of Peruvian territory. And this piece of ground had been developed into value largely by Chilean enterprise and capital; and at the beginning of the war was actually largely occupied by Chileans, who numbered, I am told, 40,000, out of the total population of Tarapacá of 42,000.

I do not call attention to this fact as an element establishing, or helping to establish, the justice of the demand of Chili. That question of justice I am not considering. I do cite it as an answer, and a complete answer, to what Mr. Blaine says, when he is offering advice to Chili, as follows :

"There is nothing more difficult or more dangerous than the forced transfer of territory, carrying with it an indignant and hostile population."

When Mr. Blaine used these words, was he aware of the fact which I have cited? It was known in his department.

Further, let me remark that, when the government of Chili would boast of its people, it boasts of them as "an industrious people," "a people devoted to peaceful toil and industry."

It appears, then, that the extension of her jurisdiction which Chili sought, and which Mr. Blaine set his face against and went forward to resist, was the extension of good government in South America; and that it was with the consent of the governed. It was the extension of a greater security of property, a further development of peaceful industry, a better social order, and an increased opportunity for the advance of civilization.

So far, then, as this matter is involved, there was no occasion for his intermeddling; but on the contrary, strong reason why he should not interfere.

Here, then, was a course of policy, entered upon by Mr. Blaine, as Secretary of State, and prosecuted as long as he had opportunity to prosecute it, which was beneficial to neither nation upon whom it operated; which was directed against the interest of civilization in the territory concerned in it; which worked out, not honor, but discredit and disgrace, to the United States; and which had no warrant of international law, no justification in the preceding policy of our country. How comes it that such a new departure as this should be projected by one who has been many years in public life and in high station, whose ability is the boast of his friends, who is vaunted as a man of extraordinary intellectual power, of unusual brain? Was there any private interest mingled in this complication, and rendering it more complex, such as might lead the official feet of some men out of the true official path?

VII. THE PRIVATE CLAIM MIXED UP IN HIS BUSINESS.

Certainly, there was private interest thrusting itself into this international difficulty. There was much going to, and coming from, our State Department during this negotiation, upon private interests that might find favor in diplomatic action. Mr. Blaine recognized such interests as incidental to his action. Let us see how these incidents were expected to operate and to influence the course of events.

Mr. Blaine's first letter to Mr. Hurlbut, written while President Garfield was unwounded, as the extracts which I have given show, touched international matters alone, the difficulty between Chili and Peru. His second instructions, given when the President was disabled, on the other hand, concerned private claims and nothing else. Here are the concluding sentences of this letter:—

"I desire, also, to call your attention to the fact that in the anticipated treaty, which is to adjust the relations of Chili and Peru, the latter may possibly be compelled to submit to the loss of territory. If the territory to be surrendered should include the guano deposits which were discovered by Landreau, and for the discovery of which Peru contracted to pay him a royalty upon the tonnage removed, then the Peruvian government should in the treaty stipulate with Chili for the preservation and payment to Landreau of the amount due under his contract. If transfer be made to Chili, it should be understood that this claim of an American citizen, if fairly adjudicated in his favor, shall be treated as a proper lien on the property to which it attaches; and that Chili accepts the cession with the condition annexed. As it may be presumed that you will be fully informed as to the progress of the negotiations between Chili and Peru for a treaty of peace, you will make such effort as you judiciously can to secure for Landreau a fair settlement of his claim. You will take special care to notify both the Chilian and Peruvian authorities of the character and status of the claim in order that no definitive treaty of peace shall be made in disregard of the rights which Landreau may be found to possess."

Here it is to be noticed that this claim of Landreau is to be promoted only in one contingency; and in that contingency it is to be pressed. That contingency is the negotiation of a treaty between Peru and Chili: a treaty, it should be further noticed involving a cession of territory by Peru to Chili. In every sentence above quoted that

idea is expressed; and Mr. Hurlbut so understood his instructions. He answered that he would interpose on behalf of this claim, if any negotiation takes place "which involves the loss of territory."

Before, then, any definitive treaty of peace was to bring this deplorable war to a close, in the only way in which there was any probability of its being brought to a close, there must be an adjudication of this claim, if Mr. Blaine's wishes could prevail. The purpose of the instructions was "that no definitive treaty of peace shall be made in disregard of the rights which Landreau may be found to possess." That is the conclusion of the letter.

The confidential agent of Peru, in presenting to the consideration of Mr. Blaine the distressed condition of his country, had set forth as the first and most important act of its government, "to conclude a treaty of peace with Chili." Now, however, the American minister is to see that before that takes place an American claim is to be considered.

The next significant contemplation of these instructions was that this claim, when adjudged good, was to be recognized in the treaty of peace as a lien upon the territory, which was to be ceded to Chili in accordance with her demand; that is, the department of Tarapacá. Now, Mr. Blaine's opinion as later expressed was, that the cession of Tarapacá was not consistent with the execution of justice. It is hardly possible, then, that these instructions contemplated that, if that territory were to be transferred to Chili subject to an incumbrance, Chili was to be allowed to increase her taking by the amount of the incumbrance. Such an increased taking would add to the deep distress of Peru a burden which Mr. Blaine could never have intended.

The allowance, then, of the Landreau claim, which the American minister was instructed to promote, was, as contemplated by Mr. Blaine, to place on territory to be acquired by Chili a large incumbrance. Its amount, as stated by Mr. Blaine, was \$7,300,000, equal to more than one third of the money indemnity demanded by Chili from Peru. This amount was, in substance, to be assumed by Chili. But Mr. Blaine would have Peru provide for its adjudication.

Now how much respect could Chili be required to pay to a Peruvian adjudication of a claim thus situated? None at all. Nations do not regard adjudications obtained in such relations. Mr. Blaine's own nation does not. When our country bought Florida from Spain, it agreed to assume the claims of citizens of the United States against the Spanish government, and to pay in satisfaction of those claims \$5,000,000 of the purchase-money. But it did not allow the Spanish government to adjudicate those claims; the United States provided that adjudication itself.

But there is something to be said of Peruvian adjudication, even when the adjudication is to be actually, and not merely nominally, against the Peruvian government. When Mr. Blaine thus instructed Minister Hurlbut to obtain a Peruvian adjudication of Landreau's claim, he knew something of the character of such adjudications. Not long before he had received a despatch from Minister Christiancy, from which extracts have been given, and which stated as follows:—

"If, for instance, . . . any man had a claim against the government well or ill founded, he could get it allowed by giving a fair share of it to the President and Cabinet officers; and, however good the claim might be, it was seldom allowed without this reward.

"The joint commission got up here by . . . in favor of American claims was no exception to the given rule; and, I am informed, several claims were allowed against Peru, which never should have been allowed at all, or only for a much smaller sum; . . . allowing some special friend, such as . . . to make the arrangements between the claimants and the officer of the government, and these claimants paying sometimes seventy per cent, and upwards of their claims, which *percentage*, to all appearance, must have been shared among all the parties acting in the scheme."

Such was the material out of which Peru was to furnish a tribunal to pass upon the merits of this Landreau claim, which had secured the friendship of Mr. Blaine, Secretary of State of the United States. And what was the government with which Mr. Blaine was in communication, and which was to authorize the tribunal requested by him? It was a government of Peru, whose authority was confined within the Chilian military lines. In its best state, which it

had not then reached, its best support came from the United States, and not from the people who in it pretended to govern. It depended upon the will of the United States, as the United States did upon Mr. Blaine's free will, as the latter, in large part, upon the right to maintain itself over its own people; and would the latter would enable it to maintain itself in any other case against its captives, Chile.

To say, then, that Peru was to pay for such a journey, Mr. Blaine could feel. What would it be the chance of its being repaid with, if he were found forwarding it to any state?

Still, if it was to be paid, as forwarded by Mr. Blaine, it was to be paid by Peru, only nominally. Suppose that, truly, when it was paid, it was to be paid by Chile — was to be paid in money, and money on real estate to be acquired by Peru, would not that circumstance largely increase the chances of its revocation, by a tribunal to be provided by the Chilean government?

It was as to the question, was not the support which the United States was giving to this claim, meeting the need of stimulus service? Chile was about to be placed on the map. If they went alone, this claim would be of no value. The claim to be of any value, it must go with the rest of the action in it.

Could it be expected to appreciate such backing? In the event of success, would it be coming in him not to be a man of feeling of gratitude for the good service done?

If the claimant, in appreciation of this service, might not the Secretary of State be reminded of it? That Secretary of State, of that character, would not be likely to be reminded of such a note? If it is possible, it is possible, that he would hold the higher official of the United States to mind those, whose interests were involved by their official action, of such honor, to say of the people, some return, would not Mr. Blaine be likely to be reminded of this reminder to any one other than the Secretary of State, in case that claim had been taken up by such promotion as Mr. Blaine actually gave to it.

Would it not be childish in that

claimant to consider Mr. Blaine a deadhead in his enterprise? If these things could follow after, might not they be contemplated before, action taken?

VIII. MR. BLAINE IS INDIGNANT: HE TAKES UP LAMENTATION, PROPHECY ALSO.

But Mr. Blaine is indignant at any representation that the promotion of this, or of any other, claim was an important portion of his South American policy: at any representation "that that policy was only a dirty effort to get two claims recognized." He testifies:—

"The fact of it is, the whole of this business about the Landreau claim and the Cochet claim had no more to do with the administration's policy about South America than a barnacle on the bottom of the vessel that carried General Hurlbut into Lima had—not a bit—nothing whatever. It never interrupted the course of it for an hour—never. In the instructions which Mr. Prescott received from President Arthur there is no allusion to them at all—not the slightest. They did not figure; they were not a part of the *res gestæ* at all; they were mere incidents."

He declares of this Landreau claim:—

"It was not a fly on the wheel."

He testifies on the other hand:—

"That policy had for its end some great objects."

In the course of his examination he tells about these great objects. He characterizes that policy. It was, he declares, pre-eminently a peace policy: "solely and entirely in the interest of peace": its idea "to abolish war from the continent: to stop it absolutely": "in every event and under all contingencies and between all peoples to avoid war, to make war impossible between American governments." "The entire spirit of the government was not for war; but it was for peace and for promoting peace: peace that was to make war impossible" on this continent. "From first to last this was thoroughly a peace policy": "to bring the nations of the North and South American continent into a league or union in the interests of peace, so that it would be impossible for them to go to war."

So Mr. Blaine testifies under oath. At the same time he testifies to what would, in some degree, seem to be a matter of fact within his personal knowledge. As before mentioned, he states that he himself originated this policy.

Now, to the originator of such a policy, this might be pardoned. At least, it would not be a strange thing, if he should be absorbed by an object, so beneficent and comprehensive as was the object which Mr. Blaine would seem to have set before him in bringing in this policy. Many men in such a pursuit would become oblivious of other considerations. This, however, does not happen in the case of Mr. Blaine. His friends claim for him an unusual, an extraordinary brain. That alone, they seem to regard as sufficient to justify his election to the presidency. Well, certainly his brain appears to be capacious. While conducting a policy which is to abolish war on a hemisphere, he finds ability to entertain other considerations. How much space these other considerations filled in his mind: how his comprehending brain entertained them: let him testify himself. Here is his testimony upon this point. If nothing else, it is fragrant, odoriferous:—

“Well, it was not done” (that is, a brave intent of his was not executed). “There was nothing done under it; and that property has gone in the way of all flesh. The Chilian government has put up by advertisement 1,000,000 tons of guano, which, I suppose, is worth 800,000,000 in Liverpool; and they pledge themselves in the advertisement to pay one half of it into the Bank of England, for the benefit of the English bondholders who put up the job of this war on Peru. It was a put-up job; that is all that there was to it; it was loot and booty. It had not as much excuse in this as Hastings and Clive had in what they did in India. The war on Peru has been made in the same interest that Clive and Hastings had in India; and England sweeps it all in.

“Q.—The whole war was about this territory? A. The whole war was about this territory that had the value in it.

“Q.—About the guano and the nitrates; nothing else? A. Yes; nothing else. It was to get possession of it. It was the old story of Naboth's vineyard that looked so inviting over the wall. They wanted this territory, and were determined to get it. I observed by this morning's April 24, 1882 papers that the English war fleet of seven large ironclad vessels have concluded to slip down the coast from Callao to Valparaiso; and they have had a strong force there all the time,—the

English have. The ironclads that destroyed the Peruvian navy were furnished by England; and the Peruvian agents came to this country to see whether they could find a good ship in anticipation of the war, when they knew it was coming. They said they didn't dare to apply in England to get it; and we were not able to furnish it. I do not speak of the government; I mean the manufacturers of this country. They did not dare to apply to England for it. It is a perfect mistake to speak of this as a Chilean war on Peru. It is an English war on Peru, with Chili as the instrument; and I take the responsibility of that assertion. Chili would never have gone into the war one inch, but for her backing by English capital; and there was never anything played out so boldly in the world as when they came to divide the loot and the spoils. They said: 'We will take half, and we will divide this inheritance among ourselves; and as to those American citizens about whom they talk, they have been discredited at home, and what right has an American citizen to be regarded down here? We are going to settle this ourselves.'

Here a great grievance to Mr. Blaine seems to be that, in taking Peruvian territory, the Chilean government provided for Peruvian debts, respected the rights of Peruvian creditors.

This, also, is to be noticed. I may have overlooked it; but I have looked for, and been unable to find, any other lament of Mr. Blaine over the breaking down of his great South American policy: a policy which was to

"Ring out the thousand wars of old,
Ring in the thousand years of peace."

Large minded, capable of originating this policy, as magnanimous as Agamemnon, he contains his grief over its defeat until he contemplates the fields of nitrates and guano that are likely to change owners; and then his sorrow and indignation find vent; they gush forth.

Furthermore, Mr. Blaine declares that the United States might have prevented something "without firing a gun." And when one looks to the context to see what that something is, it is found to be the taking of "this guano and these nitrates," without providing for Landrean's claim. Are not these expressions of Mr. Blaine strange expressions from the mouth of the Pacificator of the Western World? a diplomat whose

"feet are with the gospel shod"?

In another answer he speaks in the language of one who, looking beyond the present, contemplates the judgment of centuries that are to be. He declares with the solemnity: "And history will hold the United States responsible for it."

Responsible for what? Why, for letting go "this guano and these nitrates" as before.

Furthermore, the last feather in this business which broke the eagle's back, you recollect, was the extinction of the Calderon Government. How did that act lie related in Mr. Blaine's mind? He declared that, Calderon left in power, there was "no reason in the world why a tribunal might not have been established in two days." That is, a tribunal to pass upon Lima's claim. He then adds:—

"He was taken prisoner to prevent these very things from being done."

Mr. Jacob K. Shepherd, an agent in behalf of claimants against Peru, is reported as stating that Calderon was, at twelve o'clock on a certain day, going to sign a formal acknowledgment of Peru's indebtedness, but, at an earlier hour, was kidnapped by the Chilians.

Thereupon, according to Mr. Blaine, it might be hard to apprise the President without restoring Calderon to power.

In his instructions of June 15, Mr. Blaine directs efforts to be made against the edification of Peru. In those of December 11, he makes this opposition of his absolute; speaks of the allegedly Chilian Tarapacá as inconsistent with justice.

But, meanwhile, he had taken another view; or, perhaps I should say, a new view. Against his reflection has come to him. He seems to recollect that "This is a wicked world full of injustice and oppression. Chile may get Tarapacá. In the case what becomes of the United States do than to secure the claim which she is promoting? And will not till Chile excludes the access of this intention, that this opposition to the taking of Tarapacá becomes absolute."

Now, now you will not be "hot-headed," "hot-tempered" Chilians, and yet "astute" would be inclined to understand the position of Mr. Blaine as a whole? Might they not be led to conjecture that the United States, though opposed to

their taking of Tarapacá, would not push that opposition to the extremity of actual war, provided, only the claim favored by the United States was recognized by the taker?

Mr. Blaine lays great stress on the fact that this claim was not mentioned in the instructions to Mr. Trescott. Why should it have been? Mr. Trescott was to carry an ultimatum to Chili, while the Landreau claim was against Peru. It had not, as yet, been adjudicated as good against the principal defendant, and thus as a good lien up on the territory to be taken. Not till it had passed this stage could it be presented to Chili. Then, it might be presented somewhat in this form: "If you will take Tarapacá subject to this lien in favor of Landreau, well. Otherwise the taking seems to us inconsistent with the execution of justice."

Thus handled, what a vista this claim might open to the aggressive and brilliant state man? What an apt entrance it might furnish to a protectorate over Peru?

In fact, Chili had taken a course which had prevented this claim from reaching this stage of maturity, where it might be used against her. She had extinguished the Peruvian government that might have forwarded the allowance of this claim. And it was only then that she was to be told by the United States that the annexation of Tarapacá was unjust.

But, in any stage, it would have been very bad diplomacy to have thrust forward this Landreau claim as a cause of war. In the stage in which it actually was, to have made it a part of Mr. Trescott's message, would have been as unthinkable as for the Secretary of State to write: "Go it, Steve," on the margin of a dispatch; and this, Mr. Blaine, properly enough, treats as too absurd for consideration.

It may be that the Landreau claim in no way influenced the course of Mr. Blaine's South American policy; but, if he wishes to corroborate his own testimony to that effect, he should produce some better evidence than the silence, in regard to that claim, of the instructions to Mr. Trescott.

IX. THIS IS THE STORY. HOW DO YOU LIKE IT?

This is the story of Mr. Blaine's South American policy; his greatest manifestation of himself in high executive


office; his crown of glory as Secretary of State. I have laid before my readers the proudest chapter in Mr. Blaine's life — down to April, 1872.

Is there anything in it of which the United States can be proud? Was it not conducted with a disregard of international law, of what is due from the United States to other nations, and of what is due to the character and honor of the United States? Was it not conducted with a reckless disregard of national consequences? Is there anything in it which commends Mr. Blaine to our choice as Chief Magistrate of our nation? Do the people of the United States desire more of such administration in the State, or any other Department of its government? Shall he, who thus shamefully mismanaged one department, be placed at the head of all the departments? Shall one guilty of misconduct like his in one executive department, be made the Chief Magistrate of our nation?









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